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State and Local Taxation-1964 Tennessee
Survey
Paul I. Hartman*
I. INCOME TAx-DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VALUE OF OIGINAL INVESTMENT
AND LIQUIDATION AND REDEMPTION VALUE
II. EXCISE TAx-APPoTIONMENT OF EARNINGS BY DoMEsTIc CORPORATION
III. EXCISE TAx-MEANNG OF "EARuN, cs" FOR CORPORATE TAX PuRPOSES
I. INCOME TAx-DFFERENCE BETWEEN VALUE OF ORIGINAL
INVESTMENT AND LIQUIDATION AND REDEMPTION VALUE
Five cases involving a construction of sections 67-26021 and 67-
26092 of the income tax statute (Hall Income Tax) were consolidated
for one opinion in the Gallagher case.3 Two of the cases involved the
redemption of shares by the issuing corporations; the other three
involved the liquidation of corporations, with a surrender of shares
and distributions of assets. The Commissioner, in all of these situa-
tions, imposed an income tax on the amount constituting the difference
between the original investments in the shares and the sum received
in liquidation or redemption. The Commissioner argues that although
these amounts may not have been dividends in the strict sense, never-
theless they were made up of earned surplus as that term was defined
in Lawrence v. McFarland;4 and under section 67-2609 of the statute
"earned surplus shall not be considered as capital, and shall be taxed
as income when and in whatever manner it may be distributed. . .."5
The Tennessee Supreme Court began its discussion of the Com-
missioner's argument by noting that article II, section 28 of the
Tennessee Constitution provides that the legislature shall have the
power to levy a tax upon incomes derived from stocks and bonds. The
court then cited section 67-2602 of the statute to illustrate that the
tax is levied upon incomes "derived by way of dividends from
stocks . . . ."6 Section 67-2609 was read in pari materia with section
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Acting Dean 1964-1965. The author
wishes to express his thanks to Mr. William A. Campbell, a recent graduate of the
school of law, for his invaluable aid in the preparation of this article.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2602 (1956).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2609 (1956).
3. Gallagher v. Butler, 378 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1964).
4. 209 Tenn. 376, 354 S.W.2d 78 (1962); Hartman, State & Local Taxation-1962
Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 865, 874 (1963).
5. TEEN. CoDE ANN. § 67-2609 (1956).
6. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2602 (1956).
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67-2602, and to avoid any possible conflict between them, the court
said that section 67-2609 should be so read so as to tax earned
surplus only when distributed "by way of dividends." Thus, the
amounts received by way of redemption and liquidation were treated
as though received from sales of the stock to third parties, resulting
in capital gains which are not taxable under the Tennessee income tax.
7
In holding these distributions not taxable as dividends, the Tennes-
see court aligned itself with what is probably the weight of authority
on this question. The courts of Georgia, 8 Iowa,9 and Oregon 0 have
dealt with this problem under statutes similar to Tennessee's and have
all agreed that distributions in redemption or liquidation are not to be
treated as dividends. The reasoning of the Iowa court is particularly
interesting and seems to be that adopted by the Tennessee court. That
court stated that when a shareholder surrenders his stock in liquidation
for a share of the assets, he receives exactly what his stock is worth.
He is in a sense merely getting property that he already owns-an
exchange of one form of personal property for another, thereby
realizing a capital gain." The difficulty with this line of reasoning is
that part of what a shareholder receives in a liquidation distribution
will in some cases be earned surplus or accumulated income, which if
distributed as a regular dividend, would be taxable.
The Tennessee court's decision seems to be consistent with the
position taken in the federal Internal Revenue Code that liquidation
distributions are to be treated as sales of the stock, not as dividends,
and are therefore to receive the preferred capital gains treatment.1
2
Only certain redemptions, however, are treated as sales, the rest are
taxed as dividends.13 It should be noted that where all of a particular
shareholder's stock is redeemed, it is treated as a sale or exchange.
Under the federal taxing statute such distributions are still taxed,
though at lower rates; while under the Tennessee statute if the dis-
tributions are held to be capital gains, they apparently escape taxa-
tion altogether.
In holding that such distributions were not dividends, and not
taxable under the Hall Income Tax, the Tennessee court appears to
be retreating from the position taken in the Lawrence case that earned
surplus is everything in excess of the original capital investment in
7. 378 S.W.2d at 164.
8. Oxford v. Cuter, 216 Ga. 821, 120 S.E.2d 298 (1961).
9. Lynch v. State Bd. of Assessment & Review, 228 Iowa 1000, 291 N.W. 161
(1940).
10. Kelly v. Galloway, 156 Ore. 301, 66 P.2d 272 (1937).
11. Lynch v. State Board of Assessment & Review, supra note 9.
12. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 331(a).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302.
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the corporation. The logical deduction from this position would
support the Commissioner's argument that anything that the share-
holder gets back in excess of the par value of the stock is earned
surplus and was therefore taxable as income under section 67-2609.
The Tennessee court adopted the Lawrence definition from a Mas-
sachusetts decision, 14 and the Massachusetts court had indeed carried
this position to its ultimate conclusion and held that liquidation dis-
tributions received in excess of the original capital investment are
taxable as dividends.' 5 The Massachusetts holding has, however, been
limited to some extent by an amendment to the Massachusetts taxing
statute which expressly provides that distributions made in connection
with cancellations or redemptions shall not be taxable as dividends.'6
Decisions on this same problem from other jurisdictions under
similar taxing statutes are helpful but not controlling. The outcome
of such cases as were here presented must ultimately depend upon
the wording of the Tennessee statute. When the exact words of the
statute are examined, it appears that the Commissioner's arguments
for imposing the tax were persuasive. Section 67-2602 states that the
income tax shall be imposed upon "incomes derived by way of
dividends from stocks. . .. '7 but it does not state that the tax shall
be imposed only upon incomes derived by way of dividends. Section
67-2609 could reasonably be read to broaden section 67-2602 so as
to tax earned surplus distributed other than by way of dividends.
As the court has now interpreted section 67-2609, all independent
meaning has been read out of the provision "but all other distributions
out of earned surplus shall be taxed as income when and in whatever
manner made .... "1 8 The court did not discuss the possible inferences
to be drawn from the 1963 amendment to section 67-2609 nor did
it state whether two of the liquidations and one of the redemptions
had been made before or after the amendment. The Commissioner, in
his brief,19 argued convincingly that when the legislature amended the
statute in 1963, it recognized that the statute applied to distributions
of earned surplus by way of stock dividend, liquidation, or otherwise,
and merely intended to qualify and further define that application.
20
14. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation v. Filoon, 310 Mass. 374, 38 N.E.2d
693 (1941); Trefry v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N.E. 904 (1917).
15. Follett v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 267 Mass. 115, 166 N.E. 575
(1929).
16. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 62, § 1(g) (1964).
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2602 (1956).
18. TENN. CODE: ANx. § 67-2609 (Supp. 1964).
19. Brief for Petitioner, p. 34, Gallagher v. Butler, supra note 3.
20. For an extensive analysis of the possible inferences to be drawn from the




II. Excise TAx-APPoRTiONm NT OF EARNINGS BY DoimSTc
CORPORATION
The case of Roane Hosiery, Inc. v. King2' concerned the attempt of
a Tennessee corporation to avail itself of the apportionment formulae
of the Tennessee excise tax statute,22 where the tax is measured by
taxpayer's net income. The corporation, Roane Hosiery, was engaged
in the manufacture of hosiery in Tennessee, has its principal place of
business in this state, and is qualified to do business only in Tennessee.
In 1960 and 1961, Roane Hosiery acquired all of the stock of a
Delaware corporation qualified to do business in New York and
changed the name of this corporation to Roane Hosiery Sales, Inc.
Roane Hosiery officers and directors constituted a majority of the
sales corporation's board of directors, and the hiring and salaries of
the corporation's personnel were subject to Roane Hosiery's approval.
In 1961, the tax year here in question, practically all of Roane
Hosiery's products were sold through the Delaware corporation, most
of the sales apparently being in New York where the Delaware corpo-
ration was authorized to do business. All sales orders taken by that
corporation were subject to Roane Hosiery's approval and the Dela-
ware corporation represented only Roane Hosiery. In making its
excise tax return for 1961, the Tennessee corporation sought to use
the apportionment formulae prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated
sections 67-2702 to 2712 where the taxpayer is doing business in
Tennessee and elsewhere. The Commissioner refused to allow ap-
portionment, claiming that Tennessee could properly tax all the net
income from this multistate operation since the corporation was not
doing business outside Tennessee.
In upholding the Commissioner, the Tennessee Supreme Court
relied upon the John Owenby case23 for the proposition that in order
to use the apportionment formulae the taxpayer must prove that its
earnings are being taxed by another state. Since the corporation had
not shown that its activities in New York and elsewhere were subject
to taxation in those states, it was not entitled to apportion its earnings.
The court also seemed to rely upon the John Owenby case in holding
that since Public Law 86-27224 precludes taxation of Roane Hosiery
by other states, Tennessee could levy upon the unapportioned earn-
ings of the corporation.
The analysis and criticism of the Tennessee court's decision in the
the John Owenby case 5 is applicable to the instant case; therefore,
21. 381 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn. 1964).
22. TENN. CODE ANN'. §§ 67-2707 to -2712 (1956).
23. John Owenby Co. v. Butler, 211 Tenn. 366, 365 S.W.2d 33 (1963).
24. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (Supp. V, 1963).
25. (Emphasis added.) The writer has criticized the John Owenby case elsewhere.
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only a few additional comments are necessary here. The court does
not set out sufficient facts for an adequate determination of whether
or not the Roane Hosiery corporation's contacts with other states,
through its subsidiary sales corporation, were sufficient to exclude it
from the scope of Public Law 86-272, but the corporation argues that
its contacts with New York, at least, were such that it could be
taxed by that state. The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, stood
by its misguided John Owenby interpretation of Public Law 86-272
that by virtue of that statute Tennessee can tax all activities of a
multi-state business which cannot be reached by other states. Here
again, "Tennessee taxing authority is permitted to reap where Ten-
nessee clearly has not sown."26 Although the statement of facts is
inadequate, it seems apparent that New York could constitutionally
tax the activities of the Tennessee corporation under the doctrine of
the Northwest-Stockham case.27 If this is true, the corporation would
be subjected to the risk of a multiple tax burden not borne by local
business, a situation held unconstitutional as a violation of the com-
merce clause.2
Construing the Tennessee statute which provides for apportionment,
the Roane Hosiery opinion by Chief Justice Burnett concludes that
"if the corporation could, and did, show that it was doing business
and paying a tax on the business done in another state, then this
appointment formula would apply."29 In the writer's opinion, the
Court has made a pure judicial graft upon the plain words of the
Tennessee statute which sets forth the conditions when the taxpayer
is entitled to use the apportionment formula. Section 67-2706 of the
Tennessee Code provides that when the taxpayer is "doing business
in Tennessee and elsewhere the net earnings shall be apportioned.
...,,s3 It will be observed that this statute does not contain Chief
Justice Burnett's judicially imposed extra requirement that the tax-
payer must also show that he is "paying a tax on the business done
in another state" before the apportionment formula can be used.
III. ExcisE TAx-MEANING OF "EARNINGs" FOR CoRPoRATE
TAx PURPOSES
The case of Genesco, Inc. v. Butler3l involved a determination of
See Hartman, State and Local Taxation-1963 Tennessee Survey, 17 VAND. L. REv.
1150 (1964).
26. Id. at 1153.
27. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
28. Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962) (property tax); J. D.
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) (gross receipts tax).
29. Roane Hosiery, Inc. v. King, 381 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tenn. 1964).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2706 (1956).
31. 377 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1964).
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what constitutes "earning" within the meaning of the Tennessee
excise tax on corporate earnings. 32 In 1945, Genesco established a
retirement trust to implement a retirement plan for its employees
and in 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1957, it contributed to the trust property
having a depreciated value of 257,693 dollars and a fair market value
of 1,442,650 dollars. The Commissioner permitted the corporation to
deduct the fair market value of the property from its earnings as a
business expense in reporting its tax in the years when the contribu-
tions were made, but in 1961, he assessed against the corporation
an additional tax of 32,298 dollars. Of this amount 30,676 dollars
represented a tax on the difference between the cost and the fair
market value of the property transferred to the trust. This amount,
alleged the Commissioner, constituted earnings to Genesco which
were realized when the appreciated property was transferred to the
trust, and which had never been taxed to the corporation. Genesco
paid the assessment under protest and sued to recover it.
The Tennessee Supreme Court conceded that Genesco would derive
economic benefit from the transfers such as more harmonious labor
relations and increased employee efficiency, but held that such
benefits do not constitute earnings. The Tennessee court reasoned
that the term "net earnings" in the Tennessee excise tax statute is to
be taken in its usual and ordinary meaning; it should not be given a
strained construction. Taken in its ordinary meaning, "net earnings"
means income-some tangible profit to the taxpayer. Once these
intangible benefits manifest themselves, through increased production
or sales, in increased profits, then these can be taxed. Here, any
benefits accruing to Genesco were intangible at best and did not
constitute a realization of income upon which the excise tax could
be levied.
The Tennessee court noted that the federal Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. General Shoe Corp.,- had held
that the identical transactions did result in a taxable gain to the
corporation. The court reasoned, however, that the Court of Appeals
had made this characterization for purposes of applying the federal
income tax on capital gains and that such a characterization was
certainly not binding in a determination under a state excise tax,
which must be made in accordance with state law.
The supreme court appears to have been justified in construing
the excise tax statute so as not to include intangible economic
benefits within "net earnings." No cases decided under the taxing
statute have involved intangible benefits, and all of the cases relied
32. TENN. CoDE Ai'm. §§ 67-2701 to -2715 (1956) (Emphasis added.)
33. 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960).
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on by the state involved some sort of tangible gain to the taxpayer.3
In relying upon the cases35 that hold "net earnings" should be given
its ordinary meaning, the court was probably correct in stating that
such a meaning does not include intangible economic benefits. Federal
income tax laws aside, the ordinary business taxpayer generally does
not conceive of intangible economic benefits as being income or
earnings.
The Tennessee court was not bound to accept the Court of
Appeals determination in United States v. General Shoe Corp. that
the transactions resulted in a taxable gain to the taxpayer,36 and
it was perhaps well-advised in exercising its discretion not to incorpo-
rate such a rule into Tennessee law. This area of federal tax law
is by no means clear and is far from being well-settled. Where prop-
erty is sold or otherwise disposed of, the Internal Revenue Code, with
a few exceptions, imposes a tax on the income realized from such
sale or disposition.37 The Internal Revenue Code section defining
realization of income from such sales or dispositions states: "The
amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received. The circuit court, in the
General Shoe case, brushed aside District Judge William E. Miller's
reasoning that the corporation had received neither money nor prop-
erty from the transfer to the trust, as required by the Code, and over-
ruled his decision that the transfer had not resulted in a realization
of gain to the taxpayer. In so doing, the court relied upon Inter-
national Freighting Corp v. Commissioner,39 a case from the Second
Circuit involving a transfer of appreciated property similar to the one
in the instant case. In that case, the court skirted the statutory re-
quirements of a receipt of money or property by saying that the
corporation had received a consideration for the transfer. The Inter-
national Freighting case, with its doctrine of consideration, was based
upon the concept of "money's worth" from Commissioner v. Mesta,40
34. Woods Lumber Co. v. MacFarland, 209 Tenn. 667, 355 S.W.2d 448 (1962);
Southern Coach Lines, Inc. v. McCanless, 191 Tenn. 634, 235 S.W.2d 804 (1951);
Southern Coal Co. v. McCanless, 183 Tenn. 457, 192 S.W.2d 1003 (1946); Memphis
Doe & Forwarding Co. v. Fort, 170 Tenn. 109, 92 S.W.2d 408 (1936); National Life &
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 168 Tenn. 446, 79 S.W.2d 564 (1935).
35. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 260 S.W. 44 (1924);
National Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Dempster, supra note 24; Woods Lumber Co. v.
MacFarland, supra note 34.
36. CCH MANuAL O TENNEsSEE TA XEs f 10-301.45 (1937); Reply Brief of Com-
missioner of Finance & Taxation, p. 48, Southern Coach Lines, Inc. v. McCanless, supra
note 34.
37. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61.
38. INT. IuV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b).
39. 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
40. 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942). In this case,
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a case which the Sixth Circuit had expressly refused to follow in
Commissioner v. Marshman.41  The Sixth Circuit, in disregarding
Judge Miller's reasoning, seemingly has substituted an economic
benefit theory of realization for the express statutory requirements of
the receipt of money or property; and in so doing likely has con-
tributed to the confusion surrounding the status of the requirements
for realization of income.42 In view of the somewhat tenuous reason-
ing in the General Shoe case, the differences in the taxing statutes
and the unsettled state of the federal tax law in this area, the Tennes-
see Supreme Court was perhaps wise in declining to bring an economic
benefit theory into the concept of net earnings under Tennessee law
and in adhering to its traditional notion of a tangible gain or profit.
From the standpoint of tax administration, the soundness of the
economic benefit theory is difficult to follow. Once an economic
benefit theory is adopted, a Pandora's box is opened: How is this
benefit to be measured? What accounting procedures are to be used
for determining its status in a corporation's financial structure? Are all
such intangible economic benefits to be taxable? The expense of
litigating these questions would probably more than exceed any
additional revenue that might accrue from the importation of such a
theory into the Tennessee excise tax.
the taxpayer transferred stock that had appreciated in value to his wife as part of a
marital settlement accompanying an absolute divorce decree. The property conveyed
was in full settlement of all the wife's claims for maintenance and support. The Com-
missioner asserted that to the extent of the difference between the original cost of
the property and its fair market value at the date of transfer, the taxpayer had
realized a capital gain. The court of appeals upheld this assertion. Although the
taxpayer had not received any money or property in exchange for the transfer, he
did receive an economic benefit; and the court relied on Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940), for the proposition that such a benefit constituted a taxable gain. The
court said that the measurement of the gain presented no problem; it was the
equivalent of the fair market value of the property transferred, since in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the wife's marital rights were evidently worth the property
she accepted in releasing them. "We think that we may make the practical assumption
that a man who spends money or gives property of a fixed value for an unliquidated
claim is getting his money's worth." 123 F.2d at 988.
The court's reliance upon the Horst case seems misplaced. That case involved a gift
of income, not a sale or disposition of property; and although much of the language is
couched in terms of realization, the problem before the court was one of income-
splitting, not realization. See Note, 47 VA. L. REv. 469, 472 (1961).
41. 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960). In this case,
the taxpayer-husband released an option to repurchase stock held by his wife as part
of a marital settlement in a divorce action. The Commissioner, treating this case like
Commissioner v. Mesta, supra note 40, asserted that the husband had realized a capital
gain to the extent of the excess of the fair market value of the stock over its cost basis.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that there was no taxable gain and
refused to adopt the reasoning of the Mesta case. The court held that even if the
wife's marital rights were some form of property, because such rights are subject to
so many uncertainties, they have no fair market value. Therefore, such economic gain
to the taxpayer does not fall within the realization requirement of § 1001(b) and is not
taxable.
42. See the excellent discussion of the confusion over the realization requirement of
§ 1001(b) in the Sixth Circuit and elsewhere in Note, supra note 40.
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